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Abstract. The increasing adoption of renewable power generation makes
volatile quantities of electricity available, the delivery of which cannot
be guaranteed. However, if not sold, the electricity might need to be
curtailed, thus foregoing potential profits. In this paper we adapt ser-
vice level agreements (SLAs) for the future smart electricity grid, where
generation will primarily depend on volatile and distributed renewable
power sources, and where buyers’ ability to cope with uncertainty may
vary significantly. We propose a contracting framework through SLAs to
allocate uncertain power generation to buyers with varying preferences.
These SLAs comprise quantity, reliability and price. We define a charac-
terization of the value degradation of tolerant and critical buyers with
regards to the uncertainty of electricity delivery (generalizing the Value of
Lost Load, VoLL). We consider two mechanisms (sequential second-price
auction and VCG) that allocate SLAs based on buyer bids. We further
establish the settings of the proposed mechanisms, and show that both
mechanisms ensure that no buyer has an incentive to misreport its val-
uation. We experimentally compare their performance and demonstrate
that VCG dominates alternative allocations, while vastly improving the
efficiency of the proposed system when compared to a baseline alloca-
tion that uses only the VoLL. This article facilitates distributed energy
trading under uncertainty, thereby contributing an essential component
to the future smart grid.
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1 Introduction
Energy systems are in transition towards more sustainable and distributed gen-
eration portfolios, where smaller scale producers and consumers will participate
as autonomous agents in decentralized markets. The main focus of this envi-
sioned system is to maintain balance between available supply and demand.
Maintaining balance becomes more challenging in face of generation from re-
newable resources such as the sun and wind, which are subjects to stochastic
? The extended abstract of this paper appears in the proceedings of AAMAS 2017 [20].
availability, and non-dispatchable. Their output cannot be regulated to match
the demand, which is necessary to keep the system in balance. Therefore, de-
mand side management (DSM) is necessary. DSM is the change in the behavior
of the demand-side, which can be enabled through, e.g., financial incentives [9].
Dynamic pricing alongside scheduling of non-preemptive consumption loads are
considered the main methodologies for balancing demand with uncertain supply.
However, the former may introduce disruptive and unfavorable market behavior
and thus planning and ahead prices are required [4], while the latter can violate
the autonomy of consumer agents.
Service level agreements (SLAs) can provide the contracting framework for
balancing volatile supply with demand between buyers (e.g., customers partici-
pating in retail tariff schemes) and sellers of electricity (e.g., small-scale pro-
ducers that base their generation portfolio on distributed energy resources).
Originally, SLAs define agreements between service providers and service users,
specifying the service and its characteristics, which can vary depending on the
application. To our best knowledge, for the first time in the context of electric-
ity markets, we interpret SLAs as a direct extension of conventional electricity
tariffs, which ensure delivery (100% quality) and a fixed kWh price (0% risk).
In contrast to the current straightforward contracts, SLAs can be extended to
include more features (e.g., delivery time, reliability, penalty for no delivery).
The process of specifying and allocating SLAs to buyers participating in the
electricity market can be structured as a mechanism [12]. The design of the
mechanism depends on the structure of the SLAs and the features they consist
of. We specifically study SLAs comprising the following features:
Quantity The quantity of electricity that is subject to be transferred from the
service provider to the user.
Reliability The probability of successful delivery of the quantity of electricity
that is specified in the SLA.
Price The price per unit of the transferred quantity.
The features described above provide a basic SLA contracting framework for
electricity trading between buyers and sellers.
Example 1. A seller holds a prediction of its generation for the next day during
1pm-2pm. The generation is not certain; there is 90% probability that the seller
generates 1 unit and 50% probability 2 units of electricity. There are two buyer
agents and both have unit demand. Let us now assume that the one buyer is a
hospital that needs to perform a task, while the other buyer is an electric vehicle
(EV) that needs to charge its battery. Assuming that there is no other seller
in the system we consider, the two agents can agree on SLAs of 90% or 50%
reliability with the seller for the unit demand they require. Considering that the
importance of the task the hospital needs to complete is higher than the EV’s, it
is socially optimal to assign the most certain unit of generation to the hospital.
As illustrated in Example 1, it is socially desired that reliable energy is allocated
to critical demand, and the risk of load-shedding is assigned to less critical
buyers that in turn perform this task at lower social cost. The widest adopted
concept to measure criticality in the literature as well as in practice is the Value
of Lost Load (VoLL)[14]. The VoLL is defined as the estimated amount that
customers receiving electricity through contracts would be willing to pay to
avoid a disruption in their electricity service. In Example 1, the VoLL is higher
for the hospital than for the EV.
In this paper, we study the problem of efficiently allocating SLAs for energy
trading. We assume uncertain energy generation with a known distribution, and
buyers with different preferences with regards to the uncertainty of being served.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
– We define a contracting framework through SLAs that enables energy trading
under uncertain supply (Section 4).
– We propose a family of exponential functions that characterizes the buyers’
varying degrees of criticality, thus generalizing the Value of Lost Load with
costs associated to the risk of failed delivery (Section 4.2).
– We apply two mechanisms to assign SLAs to agents of different types, and
incentivize truthfulness for strategic buyer agents (Section 5.2).
– Results show that the efficiency of the proposed system vastly improves in
face of buyers with varying abilities to cope with uncertainty (Section 6).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents related work.
Section 3 formulates the problem of purchasing electricity in the presence of un-
certain supply. In Section 4, we introduce the structure of the proposed frame-
work through SLAs, we further define the representation of the uncertain supply,
and last, we propose a value function that determines different types and pref-
erences of buyers. Section 5 studies and proposes different mechanisms to assign
the SLAs, and it examines incentive compatibility issues arising in the domain.
In Section 6, we evaluate our proposed setting, while Section 7 concludes this
paper proposing possible extensions for future work.
2 Related Work
Several recent works have studied the problem of uncertainty in smart grids,
where the increased volatility of such systems is the main reason for the poten-
tially high costs associated with balancing supply and demand through conven-
tional generation. For this reason, incentives for balancing can be forwarded to
the demand-side [18, 27, 19]. Meanwhile, other works focus on the planning op-
timization of flexible consumers of electricity that can yield their own incentives
(utility maximization) in the uncertain environment of the smart grid [2, 10].
In line with our assumptions, the problem of balancing volatile supply with
flexible demand has been studied in recent works. In the presence of delay tol-
erant customers, service delays can be minimized via the Lyapunov optimiza-
tion technique without the requirement of a-priory knowledge of the underlying
statistics [21]. Furthermore, to deal with uncertain supply, potential scenarios of
future renewable supply can be considered in Monte-Carlo planning. Based on
the likelihood of scenarios, which is updated whenever new information about
the supply is becoming known, an online mechanism that uses the concept of
pre-commitment by the demand side has been proposed to allocate the avail-
able supply to flexible demand in order to maximize social welfare [24]. Simi-
larly, the problem of matching uncertain supply with demand is considered as
a multi-agent sequential decision making problem, where beliefs over states of
the system are replaced with beliefs over future supply scenarios [28]. Each of
the works above has a notion of cost (or criticality similar to VoLL), but none
of those considers varying risk premiums for uncertainty.
SLAs have been considered as a tool for monitoring and coordination to en-
sure trustworthiness between different stakeholders, primarily with regards to
the business processes, to ensure trustworthiness between different stakehold-
ers [11], or as a negotiation protocol [1]. In contrast to our work, the discussion
remains conceptual, and no quantitative implications on costs or efficiency are
given. SLAs have also been used in resource allocation in computational grids
to ensure the optimal allocation of computational resources and fair satisfaction
of the participants through negotiations [23]. Here, the embedding is not in the
energy domain, and the focus of the work is on strategic negotiation rather than
the elicitation of truthful reports. Other related work has studied task allocation
market mechanisms for multiple suppliers of finite or uncertain capacity [7].
In the closest state of the art work, the authors study the viability of selling
uncertain quantities of wind generation with variable-reliability [3]. They further
explore the connection between uncertainty in the generation and the costs for
reserve capacity, and real-time markets. We follow a similar idea, but we focus our
attention on the characterization of the demand with respect to its criticality,
as well as the design of the mechanisms to assign demand through SLAs for
electricity trading to strategic buyers with different preferences.
To the best of our knowledge we are providing the first work that adapts
SLAs for energy trading under uncertain supply, providing both a discussion
of the buyers’ incentives and an empirical evaluation in illustrative settings.
Here, SLAs are the resulting contracts that are allocated through auction-based
mechanisms, to distribute uncertain supply to buyers of different types.
3 Uncertainty in Smart Grids
A Smart Grid is an electricity grid innovation that emphasises the transition
from the traditional paradigm of passive distribution and consumption towards
an energy network in which each node may take on an active role. This is ex-
emplified by the increasing adoption of renewable generation (primarily from
solar and wind) that makes households prosumers, serving some of their own
load or even producing excess generation. The stochastic variation in generation
introduces uncertainty in the supply. In addition, active control of loads such as
heat pumps and batteries or charging controllers for electric vehicles introduce
flexibilities – yet in the absence of clear incentives these flexible loads may be
notoriously difficult to forecast.
In the proposed SLA allocation mechanism, participating buyer agents (i.e,
electricity customers) purchase quantities of electricity through contracts of a
specific quantity, reliability, and price, subject to uncertain supply and its avail-
ability. We consider only one seller and no outside option for the buyers. Let s
denote the seller and B the set of buyer agents, there are n buyer agents in the
set B, such that B = {1, . . . , n}.
We make use of a simple two-step time model that serves as a fundamental
model of the day-ahead auction process in current electricity markets. In the
first step, ahead timestep, the mechanism holds a prediction (i.e., probability
distribution function) of the available supply for the realization timestep. Let Q
denote the random variable of the prediction of supply at the timestep ahead,
q ∈ R+ is the observed realization of supply at the realization timestep. We
further denote the cumulative density function of the random variable Q with
F (q) =
∫ q
0
f(x) dx, where f(q) is the probability density function. Similarly,
each buyer agent i from the set B has a demand for electricity di, which we
assume is fixed and known by the agent ahead of time.
Buyer agents, based on their preferences, can get assigned SLAs of certain
quantity, reliability and price, ensuring that their demand will be satisfied with
some probability in the realization timestep. The observed realization q of the
electricity generation determines how much load can be served, and the mech-
anism determines the set of buyers that are indeed served such that the SLAs
are satisfied in expectation with regards to their reliability.
4 Contracting Framework
4.1 Service–Level Agreements
As outlined in Section 1, an SLA is a triplet (di, γi, pi), which comprises the
quantity di, the reliability γi, and the price pi per transferred unit of electricity
for the buyer agent i ∈ B. For the remainder of this paper we assume unit-
demand buyers, di = 1, ∀i ∈ B. We further assume that the delivery of the
electricity of the assigned SLAs is either successful or not. Let dˆi = {0, di}
denote the transferred quantity to the buyer agent i. We define vi as the marginal
value that the successful delivery of electricity brings to the buyer agent, vi =
αidˆi, αi ∈ R+. The value of αi refers to the private value of the agent i when
delivery is assured (γi = 1), or equivalently the VoLL. Considering the binary
model for the value that the transferred quantity of electricity delivers to the
buyer agent, the value can be either fully obtained or not (vi = {0, αidi}). The
expected value of the buyer, given the demand di and the reliability γi, is
vi(γi) = αidiγi. (1)
Let S(q) denote the reliability function (also known as survival function) of the
seller agent s. Figure 1 illustrates S(q). Note that S(q) = 1− F (q), where F (q)
is the cumulative density function of Q. The reliability function S(q) determines
the probability that the generation exceeds a certain value q. The dotted area
represents an SLA (no price pi is determined here) between the seller agent
and the buyer agent i. The demand of the buyer agent i is equal to di and the
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Fig. 1. The thick line illustrates the reliability function S(q) = P (Q > q) of the random
variable Q. The dotted area represents the portion of demand di of the buyer agent i
with reliability γi = S(w+di). The gray shaded area represents already assigned SLAs
between the seller and the buyer agents.
reliability of the specific SLA is γi = S(w + di), where w is the demand that is
already deducted by previously allocated SLAs.
4.2 Critical & Tolerant Buyers
The expected value of a buyer in (1) is linearly dependent on the reliability
γi of the SLA. Since the system gives raise to risk, we can distinguish between
different attitudes of buyers towards risk, from critical to tolerant, as it is usual in
economics and expected utility theory [13]. We define the generalized expected
value function Vi(γi), where the reliability γi induces the risk in the form of
uncertain delivery of the specified in the SLA quantity:
Vi(γi) = αidiui(γi), (2)
where ui(γi) encompasses the attitude of the buyer to the reliability γi. Note that
for ui(γi) = γi, Vi(γi) becomes equal to vi(γi) in (1). The generalized expected
value function in (2) should embrace some common sense properties:
– Buyers have zero value for no reliability, i.e., Vi(0) = 0, ∀i ∈ B.
– Buyers have maximum value for no uncertainty, i.e., Vi(1) = αidi, ∀i ∈ B.
– Buyers have higher value for more certainty in the delivery, i.e., Vi(γi) ≥
Vi(γi − ε),∀ε ∈ R+, ∀i ∈ B (monotonicity).
– Buyers have positive value for any positive reliability, i.e., Vi(γi) > 0,∀γi >
0,∀i ∈ B (buyers’ willingness to participate).
We consider a variation of the exponential utility function [13]. In line with the
aforementioned properties of V(γi), we define ui(γi) with regards to βi ∈ R.
ui(γi) =
 1− e
−βiγi
1− e−βi , βi 6= 0
γi , βi = 0
(3)
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Fig. 2. The expected value function Vi of a buyer agent with regards to the reliability
γi of an SLA. At full reliability (γi = 1) the expected value of the SLA by the buyer
agent is equal to vi which is determined by the private value αi and the demand di.
The value of βi distinguishes different attitudes of buyer i towards the reliability γi.
The values used for the illustration are βi = [−2.5, 0, 2.5].
This variation of the exponential utility function (3) can be substituted into
Equation (2), yielding the expected value of the buyer agent given the reliability
γi, where βi ∈ R distinguishes the buyer type from critical (βi < 0) to tolerant
(βi > 0). For βi = 0 the expected value function Vi(γi) becomes equal to the
expected value in (1). Figure 2 illustrates Vi(γi) for different values of βi.
Given the above definition of the generalized expected value function, we can
categorize buyer agents with respect to their attitudes towards reliability:
Critical For βi < 0, the expected value function is convex, representing a criti-
cal (risk-averse) buyer. There is a stiff degradation of the value with regards
to the uncertainty of the delivery for the critical buyer, resulting from op-
portunity costs that arise in case of failed delivery.
Tolerant For βi > 0, the expected value function is concave, the buyer is tol-
erant (risk-seeking). Lower reliability translates to a rather high expected
value, resulting from opportunity value that arises in case of failed delivery.
Neutral For βi = 0, the expected value is linearly dependent to the reliability
as in (1), representing a neutral buyer.
The generalized expected value function outlines a realistic model for capturing
buyers’ preferences. The proposed function describes the graceful or stiff degra-
dation of the VoLL with regards to the probability of successful delivery. The
type of the buyer agent i is characterized by the tuple (αi, βi). In the context
of electricity markets, the same quantity of electricity may have different value
for different consumers, which is captured in our model by αi. Furthermore, the
incurred value of a lost load with regards to the probability of electricity delivery
is determined in our model by βi. The function Vi(γi) indicates the VoLL of a
buyer agent given the reliability of the SLA as V oLL = Vi(1)−Vi(γi). The gen-
eralized expected value function can be defined in both one-shot and repeated
settings, where in the latter agents could vary their types with regards to the
outcome of their earlier assignments.
The price pi that is specified in an SLA, and hence the expected utility of the
buyer agent i will be determined by the resultant allocation of the mechanism
(see Section 5). Let Ui denote the expected utility of the buyer i,
Ui = Vi(γi)− dipiγi, (4)
where the expected payment that is transferred from the buyer to the seller upon
delivery is subtracted from the expected value.
5 Auction-Based SLA Allocation
Auctions are widely used in competitive electricity markets that take place day-
ahead [5], and they are known to yield efficient allocations even in cases there
is uncertainty about buyers’ valuations for items to be sold [15]. We consider
auctions as the method to allocate SLAs among buyers with varying private
types, with regards to the value of their demand and their flexibility under the
presence of uncertainty in the energy market. Here, we assume no agency for the
seller, who only serves as the mechanism to allocate SLAs to the buyers.
Let A ∈ A be an allocation from the set of all feasible allocations A, as the
triplet of vectors (d,γ,p), where each entry A(i) = (di, γi, pi) is an allocated
SLA between the buyer agent i and the seller agent s. Considering unit-demand
buyers, d = di = 1, ∀i ∈ B, an allocation can be written as A = {o1, o2, . . . , on},
where oi ∈ Zn1 denotes the ordering of an allocated SLA. Given the ordering
oi of the SLA (di, γi, pi) the reliability γi is given by γi = S(oid) (see Fig. 1).
Following the definition of the reliability function, ∀j ∈ B, γi ≥ γj , where oi < oj ,
the reliability is monotonically decreasing with the ordering. The set of feasible
allocations A includes all allocations A for which every element appears only
once in the set. The value of an SLA by the buyer agent i is determined by (2),
with regards to the reliability γi and consequently to the ordering oi. We define
the expected social value of the buyer agents as the sum of the expected values
of the set of the buyer agents given the allocated SLAs as
∑
i∈B Vi(γi), where
γi = S(oid) is determined according to A. The allocation A further determines
the order that buyers get served, for each buyer ∀i ∈ B, servedi = (q ≥ oid),
which follows from P (servedi) = γi.
5.1 Sequential Second-Price Auction
We consider a sequential second-price auction (SSPA) [17, 25], as an SLA allo-
cation mechanism for all supply that may become available at the realization
timestep. Items, SLAs in this case, are auctioned off one at a time. Given the
assumption of unit-demand buyers, the seller auctions off SLAs of quantity d.
We consider that the seller starts auctioning SLAs of decreasing reliability, such
that the first SLA has reliability of S(d), the second S(2d), and so on. The order-
ing of auctioned items in sequential auctions affects the auctioneer’s revenue [8].
Given the monotonicity property of the generalized value function in (2), SSPA
of decreasing reliability SLAs maximizes the revenue of the seller. However, in
later sections of this paper we also evaluate the case where the seller auctions
off SLAs of increasing reliability.
A second price auction (also known as Vickrey) [26] is held by the seller in
every round k of the auction where an SLA of reliability S(kd) is auctioned off.
Let V ′i(S(kd)) denote the reported value of the buyer agent i with regards to
the reliability S(kd) offered in the k-th round of the sequential auction. Each
buyer i places a sealed bid zi, which is equal to the reported value with regards
to the reliability S(kd). The winner agent w ∈ B is determined as the buyer who
submits the highest bid, w = argmaxi zi, while the winning agent pays to the
seller the price pw of the second highest bid, such that pw = maxi6=w zi. The
winner agent w of every round k of the sequential auction is allocated an SLA of
unit quantity d, reliability S(kd), and price pw, no further participating in the
next rounds of the auction. In each round of the auction only the winner agent
w knows the price of the assigned SLA (no price-discovery). In the second price
auction a buyer cannot increase its probability of allocation by increasing its bid
in case the second highest bid is lower. In the opposite case, the buyer could win
the auction by increasing its bid. However, this would result in negative utility
(no over-bidding).
Theorem 1. We assume that strategic buyers do not communicate their pref-
erences to other participating agents, and there is no knowledge regarding the
number and the distribution of the buyers participating in the auction. Further-
more, no buyer knows the reliability function of the seller, buyers only know that
the reliability of the next SLA to be auctioned off is lower or equal to the reli-
ability of the SLA that is being auctioned. The reliability function S is defined
for all demand quantities. However, not all demand is guaranteed to be satisfied
within an SSPA, since SLAs may be assigned with zero reliability. In SSPA, each
round of the auction is an isolated Vickrey auction and therefore the mechanism
is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC).
Proof. Each round of SSPA can be the last round or the round before with value
arbitrarily close to zero and therefore can be treated as an isolated Vickrey
auction [26]. Buyers’ dominant strategy is to report their true value function
V ′i(S(kd)) = Vi(S(kd)),∀i ∈ B. uunionsq
The proof of Theorem 1 exploits the property that no stochastic model can be
built by the buyer regarding follow up rounds of SSPA. Given the assumptions
made in the statement of Theorem 1, each round in which the buyer can wait
without participating (bidding low or zero), does not add any information re-
garding the distribution of future bids of other agents. Consequently, there is no
stochastic model which can compute an expectation of future utilities in case of
waiting the next round to bid truthfully. To prove Theorem 1, we assume that
the buyer is deterministic choosing to participate as this was the last round of
the auction to maximize the likelihood of getting assigned an SLA of positive
reliability. We showed that given the assumptions of the proposed setting there
is no incentive for a strategic buyer to misreport its value function.
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Fig. 3. (Left) The value functions Vi of the buyer agents with regards to the reliability
γ of the possible SLAs. (Center) Resulting expected values of the buyer agents in the
sequential second-price auction. (Right) Resulting expected values of the buyer agents
in VCG mechanism. The dashed line illustrates the reliability over allocated SLAs.
5.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
Sequential second-price auctions can be suitable mechanisms to allocate SLAs
to buyer agents, however the allocation of the SLAs depends more on the value
α, and less on the criticality of the buyer, β.
Example 2. Consider two unit-demand buyers, agent 1 valuates 90% of suc-
cessful delivery V1(90%) = a and V1(50%) = 3/4a and agent 2,V2(90%) =
a/2,V2(50%) ≈ 0, using the sequential auction proposed in the previous section,
agent 1 is assigned the SLA with 90% while agent 2 is assigned 50%. Considering
zero payments, the resulting social value of the above assignment is a. However,
the socially optimal solution would be agent 2 to be assigned 90% and agent 1
with 50% resulting in social value of 5/4a.
Similarly to the above example, in Figure 3 (left) we illustrate the expected
value functions of three buyers of diverse types. In Figure 3, center and right
bar charts show two different allocations alongside the assigned reliability and
the corresponding expected value. The dashed line presents the reliability of
the allocated SLAs. In the greedy allocation (center), each slot is assigned to the
buyer agent who has the highest bid (SSPA). On the contrary, the allocation that
yields the optimal social value is illustrated on the right. SSPA by myopically
allocating the highest bidder in each round (without any regards to the social
value loss) results in a suboptimal social value.
Combinatorial auctions are means to derive socially optimal allocations [6].
In a combinatorial auction all buyers submit their bids for the whole bun-
dle of items and the auctioneer computes the optimal allocation, which max-
imizes the social welfare. We consider Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [22]. Given
the vector γ of decreasing reliability of the available SLAs such that γ =
(S(d), S(2d), . . . , S(nd)), each buyer submits a vector of bids zi = (V ′i(S(d)),
V ′i(S(2d)), . . ., V ′i(S(nd))), which includes the reported value of buyer i for each
available reliability. Recall thatA ∈ A is a feasible allocationA = {o1, o2, . . . , on},
where oi denotes the order over the decreasing reliability SLAs of the allo-
cated agent. We further define A−i ∈ A−i as a feasible allocation of all buyer
agents excluding agent i. Let Aopt denote the optimal allocation such that
Aopt = argmaxA∈A
∑
i∈B Vi(A). The price pi of each buyer agent is determined
by its marginal contribution,
pi =
∑
j∈B\i
Vj(A−iopt)−
∑
j∈B\i
Vj(Aopt), (5)
where A−iopt is the optimal allocation without agent i present. Hence, each agent
pays the loss incurred to the society by its presence. Under VCG mechanism, it
is a dominant strategy for buyers to report their valuations truthfully [22].
In most problems, computing an optimal allocation lies in the class of NP-
complete problems, and thereby computational infeasibility issues arise even for
few participants.
Corollary 1. The problem of SLA allocation among the unit-demand buyer
agents can be solved optimally in polynomial time O(n3).
Proof. The unit-demand SLA allocation problem is equivalent to the linear as-
signment problem, where n agents have to be assigned n tasks while the number
of tasks is equal to the number of agents. Each task stands for a slot in allocation
A ∈ A. It can be solved optimally in polynomial time, O(n3), by the Hungarian
method [16]. uunionsq
Given the polynomial complexity the proposed VCG mechanism could be used in
a small scale electricity market (e.g., microgrid) under the presence of uncertain
generation and varying buying preferences of the consumers.
6 Evaluation & Discussion
In this section we evaluate the performance of the studied mechanisms to allocate
SLAs to buyers of different types. Specifically, we evaluate: the VCG mechanism
(see Sec. 5.2), SSPA where the seller auctions off SLAs of decreasing reliability
(SPD) as described in Section 5.1, and increasing reliability (SPI).
To study the efficiency of the proposed system when compared to a baseline
allocation considering only the VoLL, we further compare against two mecha-
nisms where only the value of buyers for certain delivery (Vi(1) = αidi) is used
for the allocation. In both mechanisms, a simultaneous second price auction
is used for SLAs of certain delivery (γ = 1). In the first baseline mechanism
(POB), the value function in (1) is used for the buyers, and thus we consider
only neutral buyers (i.e., no added value or cost is generated as a result of the
uncertainty). In the second baseline mechanism (POC), the generalized value
function in (2) is used.
We evaluate and compare all the aforementioned mechanisms with regards to
the social value, and the social welfare. For the remainder of this section, social
value (SV) is defined as the average per member value. Following equation (2),
SV = 1|B|
∑
i∈B Vi(γi). Social welfare (SW) is the average of the expected utilities
of the buyers, from (4), SW = 1|B|
∑
i∈B Ui. Consequently, the expected seller’s
surplus can be written as Us =
∑
i∈B diγipi = |B|(SV − SW ), which is equal to
the expected payments from the buyers to the mechanism (seller).
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Fig. 4. Social value with regards to the diversity of criticality, for very low values of
β-diversity all buyers approximate neutral attitude towards uncertainty in the delivery.
For higher values of β-diversity buyers have increasingly varying criticality.
First, we analyze the influence of diversity in the criticality β of the buyers to
the social value. We consider settings where buyers have similar private values α
for electricity usage ∀i ∈ B, αi ∼ U(0.5, 1.0), which realistically captures buyers
with similar needs and valuations for electricity (e.g., households). The random
variable of the supply is normally distributed Q ∼ N (µQ = 20, σQ = 5), while
the total demand exceeds by 20% the expected supply,
∑
i∈B di = 1.2 µQ = |B|
(24 buyers). We consider that ∀i ∈ B, βi ∼ U(−D,D), where D ∈ R+ refers to
the diversity of β values (β-Diversity). The higher the value of D, the larger the
diversity in the criticality values β of the buyers.
Figure 4 illustrates the performance (social value) of each mechanism with
regards to D (β-Diversity). For very low D ≈ 0, buyers approximate the neutral
behavior (β ≈ 0). All mechanisms apart from SPI achieve similar performance.
By auctioning off SLAs of increasing reliability to the buyers (starting from the
lowest reliability) the likelihood to obtain higher values from buyers assigned
SLAs early (and at low reliability) decreases. For D ∈ [101, 102], there is a clear
distinction between the performance different mechanisms achieve, where VCG
mechanism obtains its maximum performance. VCG yields higher social value
than all other mechanisms for almost the whole range of D. In the same range,
SPI shows a significant increase in social value by prioritizing over tolerant buy-
ers in the allocation3. The opposite is observed for SPD, which is the result of
auctioning SLAs of decreasing reliability (See Sec. 5.2). For high D ≈ 103 the
performance of all mechanisms decreases below the performance of the baseline
POB, which is not affected by the increasing diversity of β (neutral buyers).
For very high diversity the probability of extremely critical buyers is increased.
Consequently, the average social value is decreasing. In settings where buyers
demonstrate extreme behavior with regards to the criticality (β  0) the effi-
ciency of the system is vastly affected. We showed how diversity in criticality β
affects the social value achieved by the studied mechanisms, as well as the large
improvement in the social value that VCG achieves.
We now proceed to show that even in the case of large variations in the
private value α, VCG mechanism achieves an advantage in social value over
3 In SPI it is more likely that tolerant buyers are assigned low reliability SLAs, since
their value for low reliability is higher than other types of buyers.
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Fig. 5. Social value (left) and social welfare (right) achieved by different allocation
mechanisms, namely, VCG, SSPA with decreasing reliability sequential auctions (SPD),
increasing reliability sequential auctions (SPI), and two variants of a baseline method,
POB and POC. The social value is computed as the average of all buyers’ values with
regards to the ratio of demand over the expected supply. Social welfare is normalized
with respect to the social value obtained by the optimal VCG allocation.
the rest of the studied mechanisms. We use a diverse set of α, ∀i ∈ B, αi ∼
U(0.1, 1.0), which captures the highly irregular private values of dissimilar buyers
in electricity systems. In addition, we use small β-diversity, βi ∼ U(−5,+5), for
buyers that do not exhibit extreme tolerant or critical behaviors. Figure 5 (left)
illustrates the social value with regards to the ratio of the total demand over the
expected supply. In the case where all the demand is served with high probability
(ratio < 0.5), there is no significant difference between the different allocation
mechanisms with respect to the social value. As the ratio increases it naturally
follows that social value is decreasing for all allocation mechanisms. We can
observe that the social value obtained by VCG is higher than any other allocation
mechanism, and that there is a drop in the performance of SPI for demand to
supply ratio higher than 1. The performance of the remaining methods does not
vary significantly. VCG achieves the highest social value even in the case where
α varies significantly among the buyers.
Finally, we show that the social welfare under VCG mechanism approximates
the social value when the total demand is lower or approximately equal to the
expected supply. Figure 5 (right) presents the social welfare achieved by all
evaluated mechanisms, with respect to the ratio of the total demand over the
expected supply. The social welfare is normalized with regards to the social value
obtained by VCG mechanism (under the optimal allocation), (SW/SVV CG).
The normalized social welfare is equal to the ratio of social value remaining
to the buyers, while the rest is transferred to the mechanism (seller) through
payments. Up to ratio ≈ 1, the social welfare achieved by VCG mechanism
is minimum at the 90% of the social value obtained using the optimal VCG
allocation. The increased social welfare under SPI mechanism for ratio > 0.5
is a natural result, since more low reliability SLAs become available when the
ratio increases3. On the contrary, SPD achieves around 15% of the optimal social
value, however it exhibits a more stable (although lower) social welfare than SPI.
The social welfare under the baseline mechanisms POB, POC approximates zero
for high values of demand to expected supply ratio, and consequently most of the
social value is transferred through payments to the mechanism. We presented
the performance of the evaluated mechanisms in terms of the social welfare for
different values of demand to expected supply ratio. We showed that VCG is a
suitable mechanism to allocate SLAs in terms of the social welfare.
7 Conclusion
We proposed a contracting framework and mechanisms to allocate SLAs for
electricity trading under uncertain supply and varying demand criticality of the
buyers. We adapted SLAs as a direct extension of current conventional tariffs for
use in electricity markets under uncertainty, and we defined the set of features
that SLAs comprise, quantity, reliability, and price (Section 4.1). We further
proposed a generalized value function for buyers with regards to the criticality
of their demand in the face of uncertain delivery (Section 4.2). The proposed
value function generalizes the concept of the Value of Lost Load with regards to
the risk of unsuccessful delivery. The allocation of the SLAs to varying types of
buyers as it results from two Vickrey based mechanisms (sequential second price
auction, VCG) (Section 5). The two mechanisms ensure that no buyer has an
incentive to misreport its value under certain conditions. Last, we evaluated the
two mechanisms in an experimental study showing that VCG performance dom-
inates all other allocations over a wide range of settings, and vastly improves the
efficiency of the proposed system when compared to baseline allocation mecha-
nisms considering only the VoLL (Section 6).
This work enables distributed energy trading under uncertainty, and may also
serve as a broad basis for future extensions: (1) In this paper we have considered
no agency for the seller, the study of the seller incentives to misreport its reliabil-
ity function can therefore be a direct extension. (2) The exact characterization of
the values functions of the buyers participating in the proposed electricity mar-
ket under the presence of uncertain delivery. (3) The enrichment of the features
included in the SLAs e.g., time, penalties for misreport, no-delivery penalty, (4)
the multi-unit demand case, and (5) the presence of an outside option for the
buyers, e.g., multiple sellers. In view of the attained properties and performance,
we believe that using SLAs as we delineated here provides a promising avenue
for addressing electricity trading in future smart grids. In particular, VCG al-
location of SLAs is computable in O(n3), making it viable to assign the risk of
demand curtailment to buyers that perform this task with low social cost. It
can therefore be a tractable solution for peer-to-peer trading to balance local
fluctuations in islanded grid scenarios or microgrids.
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